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aspect of American politics is examined, the systematic study of corruption is hampered by the lack of an adequate definition. What may be "corrupt" to one citizen, scholar, or public official is "just politics" to another, or "indiscretion" to a third. Several definitions of political corruption have been proposed and gSeerallyf w be tsuiftd according to *wree criteria: definitions based on legality, definitions based on the public interest, and definitions based on public opinion (Scott, 1972) .
The definition of political corruption based on legalistic criteria assumes that political behavior is corrupt when it violates some formal standard or rule of behavior set down by a political system for its public officials. Perhaps the clearest statement of this definition has been given by J. S. Nye when he stated that a political act is corrupt when it "deviates from the formal duties of a public role (elective or appointive) because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) wealth or status gains: or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence" (Nye, 1967, p. 416 ). While such a definition of corruption is useful to the researcher in that it is generally clear-cut and can be operationalized, when the behavior in question allegedly deviates from a legal norm or standard which is not tied to a specific statute or court ruling, this definition of political corruption becomes less useful as the formal duties of office or the appropriate rules of influence become ambiguous. Moreover, this definition suffers from being simultaneously too narrow and too broad in scope; all illegal acts are not necessarily corrupt and all corrupt acts are not necessarily illegal.1
Definitions of political corruption based on notions of the public or common interest significantly broaden the range of behavior one might investigate. Consider the definition proposed by Arnold Rogow and Harold Lasswell: "A corrupt act violates responsibility toward at least one system of public or civic order and is in fact incompatible with (destructive of) any such system" (Rogow and Lasswell, 1966, pp. 132-33) . While this definition focuses our attention on any act or set of acts which threaten to destroy a political system, the researcher has the responsibility of determining what the public or common interest is before assessing whether a particular act is corrupt. The possibility exists that a behavior may be proscribed by law as corrupt but be beneficial for the common good, such as "fixing" the papers of an illegal alien who contributed his labor and skills to a rapidly expanding economy. Furthermore, this definition enables a politician to justify almost any act by claiming that it is in the public interest.
A third approach to the definitional problem suggests that a political act is corrupt when the weight of public opinion determines it so (see, for example, Rundquist and Hansen, 1976 ). This conception of political corruption harbors the same limitations as the public interest focus. Studies of public opinion have revealed that on many issues public sentiments are either ambiguous (significant portions of the public hold no opinion or hold those of low intensity) or are divided in their opinions. Additionally, a definition of corruption based on public opinion must consider the differences which may exist between the public and political elites in their assessment of appropriate standards of public conduct.
This approach to political corruption is probably best illustrated in the work of Arnold J. Heidenheimer (1970) . In his view the corruptness of political acts is determined by the interaction between the judgment of a particular act by the public and by political elites or public officials. According to this scheme, behavior is judged particularly heinous or corrupt if both public officials and the public judge it corrupt and both wish it restricted. This type of behavior is referred to as "black" corruption. An act such as "a public official involved in heroin trafficking" would most lBerg, Hahn, and Schmidhauser (1976, p. 170) discuss seminars being conducted for large campaign donors on how to use the loopholes in the new campaign fund laws.
likely fit this category in that both groups find the act reprehensible and would demand punishment for the guilty public official. At the other end of the corruption spectrum might be categorized political acts judged corrupt by both public officials and the people, but which neither feel are severe enough to warrant sanction. Quite possibly such acts of "white" or petty corruption as a city council member fixing a parking ticket for a constituent fall into this category. Between these two extremes of corruption acts lie the forms of behavior which are the most difficult to define and detect, and consequently are potentially most destructive to a political system organized along democratic principles. Heidenheimer refers to these political acts as "gray corruption" when either public officials or the people want to see an action punished, while the other group does not, or it may well be that one group is intense about the issue and the other ambivalent or unconcerned.2 Heidenheimer's work in this area, therefore, points to the existence of a scale or dimension of corruption that can be used to classify political behaviors according to their degree of corruptness from "black" to "gray" to "white." It does not, however, account very well for those acts seen as corrupt by only one group, nor does it seek to explain why some groups may see an act as corrupt but other groups see it as less corrupt. Although this conception of political corruption is based on the criterion of opinion (both public and elite), the assessment of a specific political act may rest on violation of a legal norm or a threat to the public interest. In other words, definitions of corruption are not mutually exclusive: elements of the public interest and public opinion criteria are embedded in legal norms which sanction certain political behaviors as corrupt.
Although the Heidenheimer scheme enables us to classify politically corrupt acts in a general way, a more detailed scheme seems required if we are to classify adequately the 2Harry Scoble (1973) refers to the situation (gray corruption) where public officials tolerate a corrupt act or practice and citizens are unaware or ignorant of the act but would condemn it if they knew about it as "systemic corruption." Moreover, this view of political corruption is useful and important in that it leads to an emphasis on the basic defects and weaknesses in the political system which may be responsible for corruption (see Berg, Hahn, and Schmidhauser, 1976) . Therefore, rather than attributing such phenomena as "Watergate" to the weaknesses and foibles of individual political actors, the "systemic view" of corruption would lead to a search for the sources of "Watergate" in the defects of the political process itself. many variations of corrupt acts, and if we are to develop an explanation of why some acts are judged corrupt and others not. We propose to analyze potentially corrupt acts according to the component elements apparently involved with every political act or exchange. We believe this process can meaningfully be partitioned into the "public official" involved, the actual "favor" provided by the public official, the "payoff" gained by the public official, and the "donor" of the payoff and/or "recipient" of the "favor" act. Although at this early stage in the development of a theory of political corruption it would be too much to claim to be able to specify the exact nature of each of these components and its relation to the others, we do believe that examining acts of political corruption in this manner might hold the key to a better understanding of why public officials perceive some acts as corrupt and others as "just politics," and why public officials and the public may differ in their assessment.
When discussing the subdimensions of each component of a potentially corrupt act, we will be stating some propositions about what acts will be seen as corrupt. Those propositions will be discussed in some detail later. When examining a "public official" involved in an alleged act of corruption, we are particularly interested in whether the act was entered into in the performance of the official's political duties. Presumably, an act which is considered malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance of public duty is more corrupt than a behavior engaged in outside of one's official political role. In other words, misusing one's political office for private gain is more objectionable than engaging in questionable behavior outside of one's official duties.3 A second characteristic of the public official that seems to determine whether behavior is to be judged corrupt is the political nature of the public official's role. If a public official is in a judicial or other nonpolitical post, certain acts are more likely to be seen as corrupt than if the public official holds a political post. For example, judges have traditionally been held to higher standards with regard to conflict-ofinterest situations than legislators. With the new congressional actions to regulate conflict of interest, it is possible that this situation may be changing at the national level, however.
The second component of a politically corrupt act is the "donor" of the payoff or "recipient" of the political favor. It is most 3The recent example of Congressman Allan Howe's (D-Utah) alleged solicitation of a prostitute might be a good example. He committed an illegal act, but it would hardly be called the misuse of public office. This is not to say that the voters in his district judged him any less harshly. The other recent "congressional sex scandal," that of Congressman Wayne Hayes, who allegedly put Elizabeth Ray on the payroll only because she was his mistress, more rightly fits into the misuse of public office category, and thus would be judged more politically corrupt. Probably the most corrupt situation is when the donor is the public official himself. If the public official can directly enrich himself by tapping the public till, he himself is the donor. Examples of this include padding the expense account, using public funds for personal travel, using money allocated for office expenses for personal activities, and so on. Another characteristic to be considered is whether the "donor" of the payoff (recipient of the "favor") is more than one private individual or firm. We argue that the single donor will be perceived as making an action more corrupt than if the donor is a large group of individuals or firms.
A third component to consider is the "favor" provided by the public official. We can surmise that the corruptness of the favor will vary in some ways as does the nature of the donor. Private favors and nonconstituency favors will be seen as more corrupt than those with large public benefit or those done for a constituent.4 Finally, if the favor is done in routine performance of duty rather than extraordinary activity, it is less likely to be seen as corrupt. For example, a member of Congress who makes a routine phone call to a federal 4Even though the dimensions of "favor" are similar to those outlined for the "donor," there are some differences. For example, it is conceivable that a private donor might pay for a favor having public benefit. agency to check on a federal contract of a firm whose officers supported the Congress member in an election campaign is less likely to be viewed as performing a corrupt act than one who makes threats or acts in a way that the federal bureaucrat perceives as nonroutine.
The fourth component of a potentially corrupt act, the "payoff" given to the public official, is possibly the most important determinant of its perceived corruptness. The obvious fact to consider is, of course, the size of the payoff. It should come as no surprise that the larger the payoff, the greater the perceived degree of corruptness in the act, although as we shall see later on, just what is "large" can be difficult to agree upon. The payoff can also vary according to the long-versus short-range nature of the benefit to the public official. We would assume that a short-range benefit would be perceived as more corrupt than a payoff that will yield benefits at a much later date, because the long-range payoff is separated in time from the favor done. Consider, for instance, an official of a regulatory agency who takes a lucrative position in a regulated corporation after leaving government service. Presumably the official looked with some benevolence on the activities of the corporation while in public office; if that official had been given an immediate tangible payoff, for example a gift of money, we think most people would charge corruption. But the later payoff probably is seen by many as legitimate.5
In a similar vein, the payoff can be distinguished as to whether it is specific or general. If a payoff takes specific form, such as money or a service rendered, it will likely be perceived as more corrupt than a general payoff, such as future electoral support or good will. Although this is a rather special case of payoff, it is also important to determine if a gift is related to a political campaign. Payoffs in the form of campaign contributions have a legitimacy not rendered to other forms of material payoffs. A $1,000 cash donation to a campaign is perfectly acceptable, while an equal amount offered as a personal gift to a public official subjects the donor and official to possible legal penalties.
In Table 1 , we have summarized the basic components of a politically corrupt act, and indicated the dimensions in each component which can vary according to perceived corruptness. In outlining these components and their salient characteristics, we have articulated a 5President Carter, however, has extracted pledges from his high-level appointees that they will not take jobs with firms doing business with or regulated by their agency for a period of two years. The major focus of the questionnaire was a series of items concerning ten actions by public officials that might or might not be considered corrupt. As sometimes happens, we have since found problems and lack of clarity in some of the items. These problems will be discussed later. The items are as follows (in the order listed on the questionnaire): We omitted items on which we felt there would be near total consensus, either because they were so serious or because they were so trivial: at one extreme, for example, a public official engaging in heroin traffic, and at the other, a policeman taking a free cup of coffee from a local cafe. We asked several questions about each item, with five degrees of response. In this article we will examine responses to the cent), Kansas (53 percent), Wyoming (53 percent), and Oregon (53 percent). question as to whether the act was believed to be corrupt or not.
Findings
We do not have enough items to explore systematically a number of propositions that could be generated by our work, but we will use these data in ways that indicate the usefulness of our scheme in analyzing corruption. We first ranked the items according to the proportion agreeing that the act was corrupt or very corrupt (Table 3 ). In Table 2 we have sketched the most salient characteristics of each act, according to our fourfold scheme; we have also outlined the characteristics of a hypothetical act in which a member of Congress in a district with a large percent of minority populations votes in favor of the civil rights act (CIVIL RIGHTS). In return, members of civil rights groups in the district support the member of Congress in a reelection bid. We judge that few would see anything corrupt in this sequence of events.
The first conclusion from Table 3 is that the acts considered corrupt by most people have many characteristics starred (where starred characteristics indicate more corrupt features, i.e., features on the left-hand side of Table 1 ). Clusters of stars are particularly apparent in the "payoff" boxes. Acts considered by few to be corrupt have few stars; CIVIL RIGHTS has only one. Those acts whose corruptness is most disputed have an intermediate number of characteristics starred. We can also immediately see that any one attribute, in isolation, probably does not determine corruptness. For example, an act performed in one's public role may lead to corruption, but simply knowing that an official performed an act as part of a public role tells us nothing by itself. Unfortunately not enough information was given to classify fully some of the acts on our four components. Greater specificity may have changed the public officials' responses, and would also have made the pattern of classification clearer.
Four acts were perceived as corrupt by over 90 percent of our sample: RIGHT WAY DRIVEWAY, TRAVEL, and LAND SALE. While two of these acts involve minor sums of money, all are illegal and all result in personal financial gain for the public official. In terms of our four components we can say that three of the four acts are characterized by the merger of the donor and the public official role. That is, in the cases of DRIVEWAY, TRAVEL, and LAND SALE, the public official is in the position of personally ensuring direct financial gain. Of our ten examples, these are the only three where such a merger is the case, and are the instances of highest consensus. The fourth case perceived as corrupt by over 90 percent is RIGHT WAY. Here the donor is not the public official but an unspecified second party. However, the payoff is very direct and immediate, though in the context of a campaign contribution. We assume that if a campaign contribution were not involved, almost all would have seen the act as corrupt. RIGHT WAY might be compared with another example, OIL, where the payoff from voting a certain way is much more indirect and long-range (i.e., the possible increase in the value of the legislator's stock), and fewer see this type of payoff as corrupt. In sum, from these four examples, we infer that these illegal acts are judged highly corrupt because of the merger of the donor and public official role in three cases, and because of the direct and monetary gain in exchange for a vote in the fourth.
At the other end of the continuum, less than 40 percent of the sample found LAW SCHOOL and the WEAPONS examples corrupt. These acts might be characterized as rather minor forms of influence peddling. In both cases, the payoff is indirect and long-range: good will that perhaps increases the possibility of future campaign support. In both cases the donor is presumably a constituent. The acts themselves obviously are seen by most as routine kinds of favors that public officials try to do for constituents, and thus only a minority are Willing to call the acts corrupt.
Our fourfold typology also sheds some light on why there is some ambiguity about these acts. While the payoff is long-range, the donor a constituent, it is implied that doing the favor takes the legislator outside the narrow performance of legislative duty. While the question is unfortunately silent about some aspects of the transaction, it can be presumed that the legislator is calling the law school dean or members of the admissions committee in the one instance, and perhaps putting undue pressure on a bureaucrat in the other. These acts would be considered by some to be overstepping the normal scope of a legislator's activity, but by others as routinely trying to provide a constituent service. Perhaps a clarification of the item would allow a better interpretation.
The acts where there is the least consensus are conflict of interest activities: OIL, DE-FENSE STOCK, JUDGE, and AMBASSADOR. In each case, public officials are in the position of furthering personal financial interests while making a decision in their public role. In the case of DEFENSE STOCK, OIL and JUDGE, public officials are in the position of performing a favor (i.e., casting a favorable vote or awarding a contract) for which the payoff is an discussed. The size of the payoff as well as its immediacy influences an official's perception of corruption. We cannot demonstrate that with our data, as all involve $50,000 worth of stock. Beard and Horn (1975) , however, offer a relevant example. More Congress members believe it more corrupt for a legislator to cast a vote for benefits to the savings and loan industry when the legislator owns $100,000 worth of stock rather than only $5000 (1975, p. 22). In our own data, several people indicated that if instead of owning $50,000 of stock, the Secretary of Defense were a "major" stockholder, then the taint of corruption might be greater. Finally, in these four items we can see that the nature of the public office is also relevant. The conflict of interest involving a judge was believed more odious than that involving either a bureaucrat or a member of Congress. A judge, in a nonpolitical role, is held to higher standards than are legislators.
The AMBASSADOR items differ from the OIL, DEFENSE and JUDGE acts. The payoff, a campaign donation, is much more immediate. The donor, however, is providing a campaign contribution rather than funds to be used simply for personal enrichment. To us, the AMBASSADOR and RIGHT WAY cases seem parallel. In one case, the favor is a vote, in another, an appointment. Why the former is seen as more corrupt is undoubtedly because the "spoils system" of appointment has a residue of legitimacy that the practice of "voting for pay" has not.
Our typology of corrupt acts helps explain why these conflict-of-interest behaviors are often ambiguous. As the payoff becomes more and more long-range, and the donor and favors are constituency-oriented, it is easy to argue that an act is not corrupt. Most public officials hope that all acts have some positive payoff for them, principally reelection (Mayhew, 1975), and doing constituency-oriented favors is one way to increase the probability of reelection.9 9Jack Anderson commented on this point in a recent "expose" of congressional misbehavior: "Favors are part of a politician's stock in trade. He is expected to produce government jobs, public works projects, appointments to military academies and The American Political Science Review Vol. 72
When the "favor" done for a constituent coincides with personal enrichment, then the charge of conflict of interest is relevant. Clearly our sample is ambivalent and divided about the propriety of these acts. In sum, the simple rank ordering of our ten examples shows at one end of the continuum a clustering of acts that are clearly illegal or represent a direct financial gain, at the other, acts that are minor influence peddling, and in between a set of acts representing a variety of conflict-of-interest situations. A Guttman scaling procedure revealed that this set of acts was unidimensional. They scaled in the same order as discussed, and produced a coefficient of reproducibility of .95, as shown in Table 4 .1 0 Our categorization of the components of a corrupt act aided in pinpointing some of the reasons for differential perceptions of the corruptness of various acts. The nature of the favor, the donor, the public official, and particularly the payoff were all useful in analyzing these perceptions. Acts most perceived as corrupt tended to have different characteristics from those few perceived as corrupt. And, where there was near-unanimity about the corruptness of an act, more components of the act were regarded as corrupt than where there were divided sentiments. Using only these ten acts, it could not be determined which (if any) components, or combinations of components, were crucial in influencing perceptions. More research on that point is necessary. We have only explored reasons why some acts are perceived as more corrupt than others; we have not yet tried to analyze why there are intergroup differences in perception of corruption, particularly differences between elites and the public. I I government contracts can be arranged within the constraints of the law and ethics. But some legislators are not content to wait until election day to bask in the gratitude of the voters." 10This correlation matrix of the ten items partially confirms the clustering into three groups though the correlation between the two influence-peddling items is very small. I We have no public opinion data to test hypotheses about elite-mass differences. We do, however, have data on how our respondents think citizens feel about these acts. While the rank ordering or legislators' perceptions of citizens beliefs of corrupt acts is similar to the respondents' belief that most citizens would see every conflict-of-interest act as corrupt (Table 3 ). The only acts the majority of our respondents believe
Discussion
Political corruption has not been subjected to the sort of rigorous analysis received by other phenomena in American politics. In large measure, the difficulty of defining "political corruption" accounts for this neglect. The present analysis develops a fourfold classification scheme composed of what we consider the essential ingredients of every act of political corruption. While this scheme is not a "theory," it does offer a conceptual framework helpful in comparing and analyzing potentially corrupt acts. In doing that it allows us to avoid the definitional pitfalls which have stalemated the study of corruption for so long. These problems can be avoided because the components of our conceptual scheme allow one to analyze acts classified as corrupt according to any of the corruption definitions described earlier: the public opinion, public interest, and legalistic definitions.
The scheme, for instance, renders the "public opinion" definition more usable by refining it in such a way as to allow gradients of corruptness in an act and to assist in finding reasons why public officials and elites hold similar or divergent beliefs about a particular corrupt act. This can be accomplished by systematically varying each component of our scheme over a wide variety of acts. The result should enable researchers to pinpoint differences between elites and the mass public, and thus to infer why there are divergent areas-"gray areas of political corruption." Might it be because the two groups view the "payoff" differently: what is seen as small or petty by public officials may be viewed as large and serious to citizens? Or, does the divergence lie in the perception of what is extraordinary in the act providing the favor? Many similar explanations could be posited and tested. citizens would not condemn are the WEAPONS and LAW SCHOOL acts. Unfortunately, these data do not test our propositions. They are only suggestive. The respondent's views of citizens reactions to these potentially corrupt acts also form an acceptable Guttman scale, with a CR of .94 and with no items having more than 10 percent error.
One study that surveyed public opinion about corrupt acts was that of John Gardiner (1970) , who assessed the attitudes of citizens about political corruption in their community. While he examined tolerance of corruption as it related to several socioeconomic attributes, he did not compare public and elite attitudes. He did find, however, that more educated people were less tolerant of corruption than those with less education.
Moreover, the opportunity now exists to explore possible differences in corruption perceptions based on social class and other subgroups in the population such as race, region, and sex (see Welch and Peters, 1977b ). Corruption may also be related to psychological or attitudinal predispositions. For example, "private-" vs. "public-regarding" distinctions sometimes used to explain corrupt behavior can be encompassed within our scheme. For instance, are citizens and elites whose approach to political life is considered "private-regarding" inclined to be less severe in their condemnation of certain political acts than those displaying a "public-regarding" disposition? In this manner, the study of political corruption can be integrated into the broader propositions about the social and attitudinal bases of political behavior.
The scheme can also be related to the definitions of corruption based on "illegal acts" or violations of the "public interest." Are all corrupt acts viewed similarly which are proscribed by law because they deviate from the formal duties of public office for personal gain? If so, the explanation for the common belief may lie in the components of illegal acts such as the payoff, favor, public official or donor. One can view acts considered to be against the public interest or order in a similar way. An act of political corruption may or may not be viewed by all public officials and citizens as violating a responsibility to maintain civic order or as destroying a political system. Given the wide and varying opinions about the "public interest," one would expect they would not. And the four elements, public official, donor, favor, and payoff, allow us to compare and analyze a wide variety of political acts, whether their potential corruptness is based on illegality, violation of the public interest, or condemnation by public opinion. Our approach is also compatible with the "systemic view" of political corruption. If a large part of political corruption in the United States can be attributed to inherent weaknesses in certain offices, situations, or processes, then more honest government will only come about when those weaknesses are identified and eradicated by public officials and concerned citizens. Thus an understanding of individual attitudes is important even when considering the systemic view of corruption.
Inherent weaknesses are difficult to identify. But once exposed they can be analyzed according to our conceptual scheme. Patterns may emerge which would help one predict those offices, institutions or processes susceptible to political corruption. In this manner the sources of political corruption can be systematically identified.1 2 Our approach to defining corruption, then, is offered as a way to integrate research on corruption with the mainstream of research in American politics, a way of integrating theories about corruption to a well-grounded literature in American political beliefs and behavior. This approach also offers a way to study political corruption from the comparative and international perspective. Again the four components are common to every potentially corrupt act. Different hypotheses might be suggested in the cross-national or international study of corruption, but our scheme offers a framework for such a study. For example, a hypothesis might specify that one type of political culture views a certain type of payoff as a routine part of a public official's prerequisites, while another culture views the payoff quite differently. Thus our understanding of differential views toward potentially corrupt acts is enhanced. The citizens of one country may condemn a specific political act as corrupt because it violates the norms of public office holding, while the citizens of another country condone the same act because it does not. The scheme can help us understand why the leaders of a foreign country consider it proper to expect monetary kickbacks from large U.S. corporations in exchange for a government contract, or to offer bribes to key members of the U.S. Congress in exchange for favorable treatment. Moreover, it may well be that stages of economic development, modernization, social infrastructure, and so forth, bear systematic relationship to the components of our conceptual framework. It provides us with another way of demonstrating how political corruption is related to political development. This approach can also be linked to the more traditional approach of studying corruption only when a significant local or national scandal has occurred. One can monitor public and elite attitudes over time in an attempt to link public attitudes to the situational context.
For too long the systematic study of political corruption has been neglected by serious students of American politics. That this should be so is understandable, considering not only the imposing conceptual problems but also the 121n our own sample, 35.5 percent believed that there were no specific offices particularly susceptible to corruption; rather, it was a few susceptible individuals (the "rotten apple" view). Of the remaining 64.5 percent, there was little apparent agreement as to which offices were more susceptible to corruption. Most frequently mentioned were offices handling a lot of money, named by 7.3 percent.
